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I. Introduction 
  
The NCAA is a voluntary association comprised of 1,006 active members1 in 
Division I, II, and III and 130 conference members.2  The NCAA and its programs are 
predominately supported through a bundled-rights contract (integration of all broadcast 
mediums) with CBS Sports and ESPN to broadcast NCAA championships which as of 
2006-2007 is projected to generate $503,800,000 in revenue for the NCAA.3  
Intercollegiate athletics generates tremendous revenue for both the NCAA and member 
institutions.  As a result, a high profile and successful athletics program is associated with 
a highly compensated head coach.  Modernly, the head coach may be the highest paid 
employee at the academic institution and ultimately the highest paid state employee.4  
Accompanying the lucrative coaching contracts is a heightened expectation for winning.  
Ultimately, a school’s identity is shaped by its athletics program and the recruitment of 
high-profile coaches has transcended the athletics department and has become a priority 
of college presidents.5  “College sports has become a big business with high financial 
stakes.  If the coach is not bringing in enough revenue, or is not perceived positively by 
the alumni or public, a university may be forced to terminate his employment for fear of 
losing large amounts of money.”6   
                                                 
1 Members or membership is defined as “The colleges, universities and conferences that make up the 
NCAA.” available at http://www.ncaa.org.  
2 National Collegiate Athletic Association, Pamphlet 10 (on file with the author). See generally available at 
http://www.ncaa.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) [hereinafter NCAA Pamphlet].  
3 NCAA Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 14 (Most notably the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Tournament). 
4 Mike Fish , More and More College Coaches are Make CEO Money, (June 02, 2003), at 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/college/news/2003/05/30/bkb_coaching_salaries/ (referencing 
former Iowa State head men’s basketball coach Larry Eustachy as the highest paid public employee in the 
state and that his $1.1 million yearly package was approximately four times what the university president 
earned). 
5 Martin Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts: A Practical Perspective, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 207, 211 
(1991). 
6 Mike Fish , More and More College Coaches are Make CEO Money, (June 02, 2003), at 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/college/news/2003/05/30/bkb_coaching_salaries/. 
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Schools have much at risk when negotiating coaching contracts, especially 
navigating termination in the event of major rules violations.  In addition both member 
institutions and the NCAA have faced judicial and legislative scrutiny over the 
enforcement practices concerning NCAA rules.7  Although NCAA enforcement and 
member institutions are considered adversaries during a major violation investigation 
they share a mutual interest in shielding the process from judicial involvement.  The lack 
of control inherent in the judicial process, specifically the interpretation of NCAA rules 
and evidentiary standards, creates a problem for both member institutions and the NCAA.  
Member institutions that terminate a coach who has violated NCAA rules, prior to a 
finding by the NCAA Committee on Infractions (COI), potentially face a court that does 
not hold the violation justified the termination even though the COI ultimately requires 
it.8  Additionally, when the NCAA staff and the decisions by the COI are not the sole 
interpretation of NCAA rules the enforcement process is jeopardized and uncertainty is 
created for member institutions when taking actions to maintain institutional control.  
Accordingly, member institutions should negotiate mandatory binding arbitration clauses 
into coaching contracts in order to provide some level of control over the dispute with the 
coach.   
 The problems with judicial review of the NCAA enforcement process was evident 
in the Ohio State University major infractions case and subsequent legal action taken by 
former men’s basketball head coach Jim O’Brien against the University.  Specifically, the 
                                                 
7 See Due Process and the NCAA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. S. Doc. No. 106 (2004) available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju95802.000/hju95802_0.HTM.  
8 See O’Brien v. The Ohio State University, Case no. 2004-10230, (Ct. of Claims of Oh. Feb. 15, 2006), 
available at http//www.cco.state.oh.us and OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS 
REPORT, Mar. 10, 2006, available at https://goomer.ncaa.org/wdbctx/LSDBi/LSDBI.home.  
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purpose of this paper is to analyze the recent Ohio State University (OSU) major 
infractions case9 which found former head men’s basketball coach Jim O’Brien in 
violation of NCAA rules and ultimately barred him from intercollegiate coaching for the 
next five years and the judicial decision in favor of O’Brien against the University for 
breach of contract which found the violation not to be a material breach of the contract10.  
Further, I will address binding mandatory arbitration in college coaching contracts as a 
proposed solution for protecting the interests of member institutions and the NCAA 
enforcement process.   
 Section II of this paper will review the NCAA enforcement process in order to 
better understand a member institution’s rational when terminating a coach prior to the 
COI finding.  Section III of this paper will review the court’s decision in favor of O’Brien 
against OSU for breach of contract.  Section IV of this paper will review the NCAA 
Division I Committee on Infractions decision against OSU and O’Brien.   Section V of 
this paper will analyze the courts findings in opposition to the Committee on Infractions 
decision and its detriment to OSU and the NCAA enforcement process.  Section VI of 
this paper will discuss the proposed solution of mandatory binding arbitration in coaching 
contracts and its benefits.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, Mar. 10, 2006, available at 
https://goomer.ncaa.org/wdbctx/LSDBi/LSDBI.home[herinafter OSU Report]. 
10 O’Brien v. The Ohio State University, Case no. 2004-10230, (Ct. of Claims of Oh. Feb. 15, 2006), 
available at http//www.cco.state.oh.us [herinafter O’Brien Decision]. 
 5
II. NCAA Enforcement Process  
 
I will briefly review the enforcement process in order to further analyze the 
decision making regarding self-imposed penalties by member institutions in response to 
an investigation and eventual COI hearing.  Specifically addressing the knowledge the 
institution possess about alleged violations prior to the COI findings and the member 
institution’s vested interest in being proactive during the investigative process. In 
addition, I will briefly review the Committee on Infractions and their role in setting rules 
precedent for the membership and enforcement staff and how this influences the actions 
of member institutions.  
The NCAA is a voluntary association through which colleges and universities act 
on athletics issues at the national level.11  The Association includes the membership, 
conferences, and the National Office and is self-governed by the membership.12 The 
NCAA, member institutions, and conferences must operate within the NCAA manual13 
which outlines the Association’s constitution, operating bylaws, and administrative 
bylaws.14   
                                                 
11 NCAA Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 1. 
12 NCAA Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 11. 
13 Each division has its own bylaws.  For the purposes of this paper all manual references are to the 
Division I manual. 
14 NCAA Bylaw 1.2, reprinted in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2005-2006 NCAA Division I Manual at 1 
(2006) [hereinafter NCAA Manuel]. The constitution section includes Name, Purpose, and Fundamental 
Policy; Principles for Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics; NCAA Membership; Organization: Legislative 
Authority and Process; and Institutional Control.  The operating bylaws section includes Ethical Conduct; 
Conduct and Employment of Athletics Personnel; Amateurism; Recruiting: Eligibility: Academic and 
General Requirements; Financial Aid; Awards, Benefits and Expenses for Enrolled Student-Athletes; 
Playing and Practice Seasons; Championships and Postseason Football; Enforcement; Division 
Membership: Committees; Athletics Certification; and Academic Performance Program.  The 
administrative bylaw section includes Administrative Regulations; Executive Regulations; Enforcement 
Policies and Procedures; and Athletics Certification Policies and Procedures. 
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The mission of the enforcement program is to eliminate violations of NCAA rules 
and impose appropriate penalties if violations occur.15  The enforcement program consists 
of two elements: the NCAA enforcement staff (National Office) and the member 
institution.  All representatives of member institutions are required to cooperate with the 
NCAA enforcement staff and the Committee on Infractions.16  In addition, the principle 
of institutional control holds the member institutions and conferences responsible for the 
conduct of the athletics program.17   
A. Enforcement Staff 
It is the responsibility of the NCAA enforcement staff to conduct investigations of 
alleged rules violations by member institutions.18  Once the enforcement staff becomes 
aware of alleged rules violation the staff enters an information gathering stage to 
determine if the alleged violation(s) are credible.  The enforcement staff then must 
identify whether the alleged violations are secondary or major. 19  A secondary violation 
is defined as, “a violation that is isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is intended 
to provide only a minimal recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does not include 
any significant recruiting inducement or extra benefit”.20  A major violation is defined as 
“all violations other than secondary violations are major violations, specifically including 
those that provide an extensive recruiting or competitive advantage”.21 If the violation is 
classified as major a more formal investigation begins and the member institution 
                                                 
15 NCAA Bylaw 19.01.1, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 343 (“Mission of NCAA 
Enforcement Program”). 
16 NCAA Bylaw 19.01.3, (“Responsibility to Cooperate”) see also NCAA Bylaw 32.1.4 (“Cooperative 
Principle”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 343 and 447. 
17 NCAA Bylaw 6.01.1, (“Institutional Control”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 49.  
18 NCAA Bylaw 32.2.1, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 447. 
19 NCAA Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 33. 
20 NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 343.  
21 NCAA Bylaw 19.02.2.1 reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 344. 
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receives a “notice of inquiry” which outlines the nature and details of the investigation 
and the type of charges that appear to be involved.22  The outcome of the initial inquiry 
will either result in the termination of the investigation or a “notice of allegations”.  The 
notice of allegations requests that the president of the member institution respond to the 
allegations and provide information concerning the alleged violations and any new 
violations that are uncovered in the process.23   
At this time the member institution has a strong understanding of the individuals 
involved, the nature of the allegations, and the time frame of the allegations.  The 
member institution must conduct its own investigation into the allegations and has an 
opportunity to uncover related violations which are then self-report to the NCAA.  It is 
important for the member institution to be proactive at this stage and take appropriate 
action against a coach, such as termination, if it is confirmed the coach acted inconsistent 
with NCAA rules.  This is necessary in order to mitigate eventual sanctions by the COI 
and maintain institutional integrity with the public and media during the process.  
B. Committee on Infractions 
 The Committee on Infractions (COI) is responsible for determining the facts 
related to an alleged violation and determines whether a violation has occurred.24  If a 
violation has occurred, the COI is responsible for imposing penalties which may include 
a ban on postseason competition, probation, public reprimand, and reduction in athletics 
scholarships.25  The COI will then issue a public infractions report that sets forth its 
                                                 
22 NCAA Bylaw 32.5.1, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 451.  
23 NCAA Bylaw 32.6, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 451. 
24 NCAA Bylaw 32.9.1, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 456. 
25 Id. 
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findings, its rational, and the penalties (note all proceedings until this point are 
confidential).26 
The member institution and or an individual staff member may appeal a finding 
and or penalty pursuant to NCAA Bylaws.27  An appeal may be granted if the Infraction 
Appeals Committee determines a penalty was excessive or inappropriate based on the 
evidence.28  Further, the COI findings of fact may not be set aside unless the finding was 
clearly contrary to the evidence presented to the committee, the facts found do not 
constitute a violation of the Association’s rules, or a procedural error affected the 
reliability of the information that was used to support the finding.29 
The COI, through its rationale, determines what is required from member 
institutions regarding rules compliance.  In addition, it also establishes an evidentiary 
standard for enforcement practices based upon the findings it accepts.  Past COI major 
infraction cases and the subsequent rationales act as precedent for rules compliance 
programs and creates a level of certainty of what is expected from a member institution 
when it is faced with a major infraction.  
 
III. O’Brien v. The Ohio State University 
 I will review the Ohio Court of Claims and Committee on Infractions findings in 
order to analyze the discrepancies between the two decisions regarding NCAA rules 
interpretation, NCAA penalty structure, and evidentiary standards.   
 
                                                 
26 NCAA Bylaw 32.9.2, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 456. 
27 NCAA Bylaw 32.10.1 (institution), NCAA Bylaw 32.10.3 (staff member), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, 
supra note 14, at 457. 
28 NCAA Bylaw 32.10.2, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 457. 
29 NCAA Bylaw 32.10.3, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 457. 
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A. Ohio Court of Claims Factual Findings 
Jim O’Brien was hired to take over the OSU men’s basketball program on April 
12, 1997.30  While at OSU, O’Brien found great success- leading the team to a Big Ten 
Championship, a Final Four birth, and garnering national coach-of –the-year honors 
during the 1998-1999 season.31  As a result of this success, OSU re-negotiated O’Brien’s 
contract which resulted in a substantial increase in compensation and created a significant 
limitation on OSU’s right to terminate his employment.32   
On April 24, 2004 O’Brien revealed to Andy Geiger, then OSU athletics director, 
that he had provided financial assistance to then prospective student-athlete Alex 
Radojevic in 1998.33  O’Brien revealed this information because he became aware that 
the financial assistance to Radojevic would most likely become public due to a lawsuit 
filed by a woman concerning financial assistance to another OSU men’s basketball 
student-athlete, Boban Savovic.34  Consequently, on June 8, 2004 O’Brien was given a 
letter by Geiger notifying him of the University’s intention to terminate his employment 
as head coach of the men’s basketball program.35 
B. Court’s Analysis of NCAA Rules Violation 
OSU claimed that in providing Radojevic financial assistance O’Brien violated 
NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1 General Regulation which states,  
an institution's staff member or any representative of its athletics interests shall not be 
involved, directly or indirectly, in making arrangements for or giving or offering to give 
                                                 
30 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 1. 
31 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 5. 
32 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 5. 
33 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 6 ($6,000 to assist Radojevic’s family pay for medical/funeral 
expenses for his family who were in the former Yugoslavia during the civil war ).  
34 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 6.  
35 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 7-8.  
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any financial aid or other benefits to the prospect or the prospect's relatives or friends, 
other than expressly permitted by NCAA regulations…36 
 
O’Brien, however, maintained that the financial assistance to the Radojevic was not an 
NCAA violation because Radojevic was a professional athlete at the time the loan was 
made. 37   
O’Brien became aware of Radojevic’s professional status in late September or 
early October of 1998 after receiving a letter from a Yugoslavian professional basketball 
team indicating Radojevic had signed a contract and received monetary compensation 
from the organization.38  However, O’Brien withheld this information from OSU’s 
compliance office and signed Radojevic to a National Letter of Intent in November of 
1998.39  In February of 1999 the NCAA became aware that Radojevic had signed a 
professional basketball contract in 1996 and notified OSU.40  OSU declared Radojevic 
ineligible and filed an application for reinstatement which was denied and an appeal that 
followed was also denied.41  Ultimately Radojevic never enrolled at OSU and was 
selected as the 12th pick in the 1999 NBA draft.42   
C. NCAA Rules Interpretation- Expert Testimony 
Both O’Brien and OSU presented expert witnesses to testify about whether 
O’Brien’s financial assistance to Radojevic was an NCAA violation.   
David Swank, professor of law at the University of Oklahoma, former member of 
the NCAA Executive Committee, and former chairman of the NCAA Committee on 
                                                 
36 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 12. 
37 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 15. 
38 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 2. 
39 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 3. 
40 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 4. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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Infractions, was called by O’Brien.43  Swank testified that in his opinion O’Brien’s 
financial assistance to Radojevic was not an NCAA violation because he was not a 
prospective student-athlete at the time of the loan.44  Swank believed that Radojevic 
irrevocably lost his amateur status when he signed a professional contract, citing NCAA 
Bylaw 12.1.1: 
Amateur Status states: 
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate 
competition in a particular sport if the individual: 
(a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport;  
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of 
intercollegiate athletics participation; 
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regardless 
of its legal enforceability or any consideration received; 
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other 
form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based upon athletics 
skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; 
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.4, even if no pay or 
remuneration for expenses was received;  
(f) Subsequent to initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional draft 
(see also Bylaws 12.2.4.2.1 and 12.2.4.2.3); or  
(g) Enters into an agreement with an agent.45 
and therefore was ineligible for intercollegiate athletics competition when he signed a 
professional contract in 1996.46   
Dan Beebe, Senior Associate Commissioner of the Big Twelve Conference, 
former enforcement officer, and former director of enforcement, was called by OSU.47  
Beebe testified48  that in his opinion the loan to Radojevic was in violation of NCAA 
Bylaw 13.2.149 in conjunction with NCAA Bylaw 13.02.1[1] which states:  
                                                 
43 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 15-16. 
44 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 16. 
45 NCAA Bylaw 12.1.1, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 70. 
46 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 17. 
47 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 19. 
48 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 18-19. 
49 NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1 (“General Regulation”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 102. 
An institution's staff member or any representative of its athletics interests shall not be involved, 
directly or indirectly, in making arrangements for or giving or offering to give any financial aid or 
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A prospective student-athlete ("prospect") is a student who has started classes for the 
ninth grade. In addition, a student who has not started classes for the ninth grade becomes 
a prospective student-athlete if the institution provides such an individual (or the 
individual's relatives or friends) any financial assistance or other benefits that the 
institution does not provide to prospective students generally. An individual remains a 
prospective student-athlete until one of the following occurs (whichever is earlier): 
 
(a) The individual officially registers and enrolls in a minimum full-time program 
of studies and attends classes in any term of a four-year collegiate institution's 
regular academic year (excluding summer); or 
(b) The individual participates in a regular squad practice or competition at a 
four-year collegiate institution that occurs before the beginning of any term; or 
(c) The individual officially registers and enrolls and attends classes during the 
summer prior to initial enrollment and receives institutional athletics aid.50  
 
Further, Beebe testified that because Radojevic had not met any of the above 
requirements (a-c) he was still considered a prospective student-athlete in 1998 even 
though he became a professional in 1996.51  Therefore O’Brien’s financial assistance 
constituted an impermissible recruiting inducement. 
The court determined that Beebe’s interpretation of NCAA Bylaws was based on 
a “literal interpretation” of NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1 and an extremely “broad” definition of 
the term “prospective student-athlete” in NCAA Bylaw 13.02.1[1].52  The court 
concluded that Swank’s view represents a more “practical” application of NCAA rules.53 
However, the court noted that the evidence presented showed that the NCAA 
enforcement staff adopted the “literal interpretation” having cited O’Brien for the alleged 
recruiting violation.54  The court concluded that it is not the appropriate body to decide 
whether O’Brien committed a major infraction but found that O’Brien had reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                 
other benefits to the prospect or the prospect's relatives or friends, other than expressly permitted 
by NCAA regulations. 
50 NCAA Bylaw, 13.02.11(“Prospective Student-Athlete”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 
88. 
51 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 19. 
52 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 20. 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
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cause to believe that he had committed an infraction.55  Although, the court found 
O’Brien had reason to believe he had committed an infraction the court interpreted 
Section 5.1 and Section 5.5 of the contract to allow O’Brien to retain his employment 
even though he committed a major violation, because it did not frustrate his performance 
of the contract.56  The relevant portions of the contract are set out below: 
5.1 Terminations for Cause- Ohio State may terminate this agreement at any time for any 
cause, which, for the purpose of this agreement, shall be limited to the occurrence of one 
or more of the following: 
…(b) a violation by Coach (or a violation by a men’s basketball program staff member 
about which Coach knew or should have known and did not report to appropriate Ohio 
State personnel) of applicable law, policy, rule or regulation of the NCAA or the Big Ten 
Conference which leads to a ‘major’ infraction investigation by the NCAA or the Big Ten 
Conference and which results in a finding by the NCAA or the Big Ten Conference of 
lack of institutional control over the men’s basketball program or which results in Ohio 
State being sanctioned by the NCAA or the Big Ten Conference.” (note non-relevant 
sections of Sec. 5.1 have been excluded from this footnote) 
 
5.5 Suspension of other Disciplinary Action -  If Coach is found to have violated any law, 
policy, rule or regulation of the NCAA, the Big Ten Conference or Ohio State, Coach 
may be subject to suspension or other disciplinary or corrective action as set forth in the 
applicable enforcement procedures (subject to the provisions of Section 5.6 hereof) 57 
 
D. Severity of Violations 
The court assessed the potential harm from NCAA sanctions that OSU may face 
as a result of O’Brien’s violation.  OSU argued that O’Brien breached the employment 
agreement and deprived it of the benefit of the contract in the following ways: subjected 
it to NCAA sanctions; adversely affected OSU’s reputation in the community; and 
breached the trust between O’Brien and OSU’s athletic director.58  For the purposes of 
this paper I will only discuss the sanctions portion of this argument.  The court 
                                                 
55 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 20-21. 
56 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 40. 
57 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 23, 40 
58 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 26. 
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determined that O’Brien’s payment to Radojevic minimally impacted OSU’s possible 
NCAA sanctions.   
The court provided the following rational:59 
• The court was uncertain about the extent of harm the Radojevic matter would 
have on potential NCAA sanctions because the notice of allegations listed 
seven violations in the basketball program (six of which were related to 
former student-athlete Boban Savovic). 
• The court believed the availability of the four-year statute of limitations 
defense to OSU with respect to the Radojevic matter was a potential 
mitigating factor for sanctions. 
• The court believed OSU’s self-imposed sanctions minimally debilitated the 
men’s basketball program.60  
 
In addition the court concluded the financial assistance was made for 
humanitarian purposes and not to gain an improper recruiting advantage (inducement).61  
Ultimately the court concluded that “the evidence shows that the NCAA sanctions and 
the injury to [OSU’s] reputation that can be fairly attributed to the loan are relatively 
minor”.62   
E. Damage to OSU 
 The damages portion of the lawsuit is scheduled to commence on April 12, 2006 
unless a settlement is reached.63  The Ohio Court of Claims indicates that O’Brien’s 
lawsuit is for $9.5 million which includes the $3,484,205 OSU would have paid him 
when he was terminated with five years left on his contract plus damages.64  In addition 
to the monetary damages OSU may face, the integrity of the athletics program has been 
                                                 
59 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 26-27. 
60 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 27-28. The court determined that the post-season ban implemented 
for the 2004-05 season was mitigated by the fact that the team was unlikely to receive a post-season 
tournament invitation and that the reduction of two scholarships for the 2005 recruiting class was not that 
significant because the 2005-06 recruiting class is expected to be one of the best in school history.  
61 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 36. 
62 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 37. 
63 O’Brien-OSU Dispute Due Back in Court Next Month, The Columbus Dispatch , Mar. 4, 2006 available 
at hhttp://www.dispatch.com/print_template.php?story=dispatch/2006/03/04/20060304-C4-02.html.  
64 Id.  
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harmed.  Geiger testified at the trial that OSU’s reputation has been “irreparably harmed” 
and that a “cloud hangs over [the] basketball program”.65  In addition Geiger stated that 
the “the adverse publicity nationally that the program has received has done damage that 
will take years to repair”.66 
F. Evidentiary Standard 
The court determined a “threshold” issue in the case was whether to admit the 
deposition testimony of Radojevic by the NCAA enforcement staff.67  The court 
concluded the testimony was “riddled” with inadmissible hearsay and lay opinions and 
that the statements lack credibility.68  The court also noted that the depositions were taken 
by the NCAA enforcement staff who has taken an adversarial position against O’Brien in 
the underlying NCAA allegations.69  The court ultimately held that the testimony was 
inadmissible.70  In addition, part of Bebe’s expert testimony was based upon reviewing 
interview summaries authored by the enforcement staff which was disregarded by the 
court due to their being no credible evidence presented in the case to support the 
finding.71 
 
IV. Ohio State University Public Infractions Report  
 On December 9, 2005 and February 3-4, 2006 representatives from OSU 
appeared before the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions to address allegations of 
rules violations in the areas of recruiting, extra benefits, academic fraud, ethical conduct 
                                                 
65 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 28. 
66 Id.  
67 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 9. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 O’Brien Decision, supra note, at 19 see fn.5. 
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and rules compliance monitoring.72  Specifically, the men’s basketball team, men’s 
football team, and women’s basketball team faced allegations with the men’s basketball 
team facing the majority of the violations.  For the purposes of this article I will focus on 
the violations concerning the financial assistance provided to Alex Radojevic by former 
head men’s basketball coach Jim O’Brien. 
A. Committee on Infractions Findings of Fact 
The Committee on Infractions and the Ohio Court of Claims findings of fact were 
substantially similar.  The (COI) in agreement with OSU and the enforcement staff found 
that O’Brien impermissibly agreed to provide financial assistance to Radojevic.73  The 
COI also found that O’Brien became aware of Radojevic’s professionalism and withheld 
this information from the compliance office.74  Further, O’Brien, with this knowledge, 
participated in the institution’s petition for reinstatement of Radojevic’s eligibility and 
ultimately urged the institution to appeal the decision and participated in the 
teleconference for the appeal.75   In addition, the COI in agreement with OSU and the 
enforcement staff agreed that the violation was not barred NCAA Bylaw 32.6.3, the 
statute of limitations.76   
B. NCAA Rules Violations 
Unlike the court, the COI found O’Brien’s action was a clear violation of NCAA 
rules.  O’Brien argued on the same basis as he did in court and maintained that the 
financial assistance was not a NCAA violation because Radojevic had professionalized 
                                                 
72 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 1. 
73 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 3-4. 
74 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 5. 
75 Id.  
76 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 4. 
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himself prior to the agreement and subsequent transfer of cash.77  In addition, O’Brien 
maintained that even if it was a violation it was barred by the statute of limitations.78   
The COI determined that Radojevic was a prospective student-athlete79 at the time 
of the agreement and the provision of cash.80  Specifically, the COI found that “NCAA 
bylaws, and their consistent application, are clear that at one and the same time an 
individual may be a prospect and also have engaged in conduct, including loss of amateur 
status, that renders him ineligible”. 81  Further the committee regarded O’Brien’s 
argument “as based, in the best light, upon a fundamental misapprehension of NCAA 
bylaws and confuse eligibility issues with prospect status”.82  Ultimately, the COI found 
that O’Brien provided Radojevic with an impermissible recruiting inducement in 
violation of NCAA bylaw 13.2.183, “General Regulation” concerning offers and 
inducements to prospective student-athletes.84 
C. Severity of Violation 
The COI found O’Brien’s violation to be severe and, unlike the court, did not find 
any mitigating factors.  The COI was particularly concerned with “the pattern by both 
former coaches85 of failing to provide critical information in a timely fashion to the 
institution as well as providing such information only when clear that it otherwise would 
                                                 
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 NCAA Bylaw 13.02.11 (“Prospective Student Athlete”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 
88.  
80 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 6. 
81 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 6-7. 
82 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 6. 
83 NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1, reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 102. 
84 OSU public report p. 3 
85 Then OSU assistant men’s basketball coach Paul Biancardi was also implicated in the transfer of cash to 
Radojevic and other violations.  
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become known”.86  Further the COI noted that O’Brien’s financial assistance to 
Radojevic was contrary to “one of the most fundamental of all NCAA principles- that 
cash cannot be provided to a prospect or to his friends or family.”87 
The COI stated that the failure to disclose Radojevic’s professionalism during the 
reinstatement hearings was a “critical” component in the NCAA eligibility decision and 
that O’Brien’s omission was misleading.88  The COI went on to state that “this conduct 
falls far short of the NCAA cooperative principle and the expectation that institutions and 
their staff will be forthcoming regarding violations.”89   
The COI found that O’Brien’s humanitarian reasoning did not mitigate the 
violation and that this “explanation neither excused the violation nor explains continued 
active recruitment of the prospect.”90   
The COI also determined that NCAA Bylaw 32.6.3 Statute of Limitations91 was 
not applicable to this violation because it met two exceptions to the rule: 
(b)  permits processing of all violations that constitute a pattern, even those that 
otherwise would be barred by the four-year statute of limitation; and 
                                                 
86 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 2. 
87 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 7. 
88 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 11. 
89 Id. 
90 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 6. 
91 NCAA Bylaw 32.6.3 (“Statute of Limitations”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 452. 
Allegations included in notice of allegations shall be limited to possible violations occurring not 
earlier than four years before the date the notice of inquiry is forwarded to the institution or the 
date the institution notifies (or, if earlier, should have notified) the enforcement staff of its 
inquiries into the matter.  However, the following shall not be subject to the four year-limitation: 
… 
(b)  Allegations in a case in which information is developed to indicate a patter of willful 
violations on the part of the institution or individual involved, which began before but 
continued the four-year period; and 
(c)  Allegations that indicate a blatant disregard for the Association’s fundamental recruiting, 
extra-benefit, academic or ethical-conduct regulations or that involve an effort to conceal 
the occurrence of the violation.  In such cases, the enforcement staff shall have a one-year 
period after the date information concerning the matter becomes available to the NCAA 
to investigate and submit to the institution an official inquiry concerning the matter. 
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(c)  permits the processing of blatant violations not earlier discoverable to assure that 
violators are answerable for violations whose concealment prevented discovery, 
and earlier processing.92 
 
The COI found that O’Brien acted willfully in his efforts to provide an impermissible 
inducement to Radojevic.  In addition, the COI recognized a pattern between violations 
concerning Radjojevic and Savovic and considered them “inextricably linked”.93 
Although the specific violations pertaining directly to [Radojevic] fell outside the 
applicable four-year period, these violations, and those concerning [Savovic], are part of 
a pattern of violations that are inextricably linked.  Among other things, the pattern 
includes the following 
 
• Both prospects are from the same Serbian community, and in fact, knew each 
other in Serbia. 
• The intermediary was the point person for each in his recruitment by the 
institution.  His conduct included accompanying the former assistant coach to 
meet [Savovic] when he arrived for his official visit and acting as a conduit 
for the former assistant coach in forwarding $6,000 payment to [Radojevic’s] 
family. 
• Both prospects were recruited during the 1997-98 recruiting season. 
• Both prospects were in Columbus, Ohio, in summer 1998. 
• Both prospects were put in contact with [athletics] representative.  
• Both prospects received impermissible inducements, including free housing 
and meals, from [athletics] representative 1.  She provided impermissible 
benefits to [Savovic] during the entire time he was enrolled at the 
institution.94 
 
Finally, the COI found O’Brien in violation of ethical conduct principles pursuant 
to NCAA Bylaw 10.1(c), “Unethical Conduct” which includes “knowing involvement in 
offering or providing a prospective or an enrolled student-athlete an improper inducement 
or extra benefit or improper financial aid…” 95.96   
Specifically the COI found,97 
The former head coach acted contrary to the principles of ethical conduct, inasmuch as he did 
not on all occasions deport himself in accordance with the generally recognized high 
                                                 
92 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 11. 
93 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 12. 
94 Id. 
95 NCAA Bylaw 10.1 (“Unethical Conduct”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 53. 
96 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 31. 
97 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 32. 
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standards of honesty and sportsmanship normally associated with the conduct and 
administration of intercollegiate athletics due to this involvement in or knowledge 
of…offering and providing a recruiting inducement to [Radojevic]. 
 
D. Damage to OSU 
 
In addition to OSU’s self-imposed penalties98 the COI imposed the following 
penalties related specifically to the men’s basketball recruiting violations99: 
(a) public reprimand and censure; 
 
(b) the number of expense-paid visits recruits may make to the campus is limited 
to three during the 2006-07 academic year which is a reduction of one from 
the average of four visits per year during the last four years  
 
(c) the institution must reimburse monies received for participation in the 1999, 
2000, 2001 and 2002 NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Tournament (The 
Columbus Dispatch reported that the repayment amounts to almost 
$800,000.100) 
 
(d) the institution will vacate its team record and the record of the former head 
coach will be reconfigured to reflect the vacated records which will be 
recorded in all publications in which men’s basketball records for the 1998-99 
through the 2001-03  
 
(e) former head coach is subject to a five-year show-cause penalty (which would 
limit athletically related duties of the head coach at any institution) if he seeks 
employment or affiliation in an athletically related position at an NCAA 
member institution. 
 
E. Evidentiary Standard  
The evidence that was not allowed in the court proceeding was accepted by the 
COI.  The COI, OSU, and enforcement staff were in substantial agreement on the facts 
                                                 
98 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 42. OSU imposed the following self-imposed penalties: withheld the men’s 
basketball team from postseason competition following the 2004-05 season, terminated former head coach 
on June 8, 2004, reduced number of scholarships in men’s basketball by two for the 2005-06 recruiting 
class.  
99 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 42-43 and NCAA, Ohio State University and Former Men’s Basketball 
Coaches Penalized for Infractions, (March 10, 2006), available at 
http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/media_and_events/press_room/2006/march/20060310_osu_infractions_rls.ht
ml.  
100 NCAA Sanctions, The Columbus Dispatch , (March 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.columbusdispatch.com/bball/bball.php?story=dispatch/2006/03/11/20060311-A1-00.html.  
 21
surrounding the recruiting inducement O’Brien made to Radojevic.101  Further, 
Radojevic’s testimony, taken by the enforcement staff, was used as a basis for the 
“Committee Rationale” which is drafted by the COI to substantiate their findings.102   
 
 
V. Judge Joseph T. Clark’s Misapprehension of NCAA Rules 
 
I will review the courts rational in determining that the Radojevic matter 
minimally impacted OSU’s potential NCAA sanctions, which is in conflict with the COI 
findings, and how the findings were detrimental to both the NCAA enforcement process 
and to OSU.  Judge Clark’s holding that O’Brien’s performance was “sufficient” under 
the contract completely disregards the fundamental principle of the NCAA- namely fair 
play. 103  In addition it ignores OSU’s primary responsibility of institutional control and 
that its athletics program operates within the rules determined by the membership.  Judge 
Clark writes, “the court is persuaded, given the contract language, that this single, 
isolated failure of performance was not so egregious as to frustrate the essential purpose 
of that contract and thus render future performance by [OSU] impossible”.104  However, 
this was anything but a single, isolated event and as the COI penalties demonstrate, was 
an egregious violation on behalf of O’Brien. 
Specifically, I will criticize three parts (infra p. 14) of Judge Clark’s decision 
which minimize the impact of O’Brien’s actions to the detriment of OSU and NCAA 
rules. 
 
                                                 
101 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 4 
102 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 9 (referencing Radojevic’s testimony regarding the timeframe for the cash 
payment). 
103 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at  11 
104 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 42 
 22
 
A.  The court was uncertain about the extent of harm the Radojevic matter 
would have on potential NCAA sanctions because the notice of allegations 
listed seven violations in the basketball program (six of which were related to 
former student-athlete Boban Savovic). 
First, the financial assistance O’Brien provided to Radojevic would constitute a 
major violation standing on its own.  A major violation is defined as those “providing an 
extensive recruiting advantage” which would encompass a head coach giving a 
prospective student-athlete $6,000.  If this were the sole violation found by the COI it 
would have warranted a show-cause order which, essentially bars a coach from 
employment at an NCAA member institution for a specified period of time and 
specifically requires,  
…a member institution to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Committee on Infractions 
for not taking appropriate disciplinary or corrective action against an institutional staff 
member or representative of the institution’s athletics interests identified by the 
committee as having been involved in a violation of NCAA regulations that has been 
found by the committee.105 
 
Therefore, if the member institution terminated the coach’s employment prior to the 
finding by the COI, it would be reasonable, if not expected, because the show-cause order 
would be anticipated following a severe violation.  
  Second, the financial assistance provided to Radojevic, which was the basis of 
O’Brien’s termination, became public through a lawsuit filed by a woman seeking to 
recoup financial assistance she provided to former OSU student-athlete Boban Savovic 
from an OSU booster.  The Savovic violations and O’Brien’s financial assistance to 
Radojevic constituted the alleged violations against the OSU’s men’s basketball program.   
                                                 
105 NCAA Bylaw 19.02.1 (“Show-Cause Order”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 343  
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Although the basis of O’Brien’s termination was the Radojevic matter it cannot be 
understood in a vacuum when analyzing the extent of NCAA penalties against OSU.  A 
major violation investigation begins with an initial allegation which will uncover other 
violations within the specific sport or athletics program as a whole.  In fact, the member 
institution has an obligation to report information of new violations that are uncovered 
while conducting an internal investigation of the initial alleged violation.106  At the time 
O’Brien admitted to Geiger that he provided financial assistance to Radojevic it would 
constitute a major violation while the violations concerning Savovic constituted alleged 
violations.   
The outcome of the alleged violations and any unknown violations are interrelated 
to the known Radojevic matter and build upon each other to form the ultimate findings of 
the COI and penalty structure.  The court failed to recognize that the Savovic and 
Radojevic violations were interrelated and analyzed the Radojevic matter apart from the 
remaining violations when addressing its affect on potential COI sanctions.  The COI, 
however, recognized that the Savovic and Radojevic violations were interrelated and 
those violations mutually impacted the severity of the COI sanctions.     
 
B.  The court believed the availability of the four-year statute of limitations 
defense to OSU with respect to the Radojevic matter was a potential 
mitigating factor for sanctions. 
 
 Although this defense was available to OSU, O’Brien’s financial assistance to 
Radojevic was a willful and blatant and therefore met the two exceptions to the statute of 
                                                 
106 NCAA Bylaw 32.6.1.1 (“Contents of the Notice of Allegations Cover Letter”), reprinted in NCAA 
Manuel, supra note 14, at 451. 
… (b) Request the chief executive officer to respond to the allegations and to provide all relevant 
information which the institution has or may reasonably obtain, including information uncovered 
related to new violations.  The responsibility to provide information continues until the case has 
been concluded.  
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limitations, rendering the defense moot.  See the Committee on Infractions’ conclusions 
infra. Part IV.B p. 16.  
C.  The court believed OSU’s self-imposed sanctions minimally debilitated the 
men’s basketball program. 
 
The court determined that the post-season ban implemented for the 2004-05 
season was mitigated by the fact that the team was unlikely to receive a post-season 
tournament invitation and that the reduction of two scholarships for the 2005 recruiting 
class was not that significant because the 2005-06 recruiting class is expected to be one 
of the best in school history.107  This conclusion fails to recognize that uninvolved 
student-athletes who had nothing to do with O’Brien’s NCAA violations are being 
penalized.  This is a great detriment to the team and each individual player who is unable 
to compete in the post-season- whether that is the NCAA Division I Men’s 
Championship Tournament or the National Invitation Tournament.108  The court rationale 
was based on the testimony of Michelle Willis, OSU a senior associate athletics director, 
who stated that at the time the post-season ban was imposed (December 9, 2004), she did 
not believe the team was good enough to receive a post-season tournament invitation.109  
However, the OSU men’s basketball team finished with a 23-12 record with a key victory 
over then undefeated University of Illinois, who was ranked number one in the 
country.110  This would have more likely than not merited a post-season tournament 
invitation.   
                                                 
107 O’Brien Decision, supra note, 9 at 27-28. 
108 See Matthew Keegan, Due Process and the NCAA: Are Innocent Student-Athletes Afforded Adequate 
Protection from Improper Sanctions? A Call for Change in the NCAA Enforcement Procedures, 25 N. ILL. 
U.L. REV. 297 (2005) (discussing the detriment to uninvolved student-athletes during a ban on postseason 
competition). 
109 O’Brien Decision, supra note 10, at 27. 
110 Ohio State University Men’s Basketball 2004-05 season results, available at 
http://ohiostatebuckeyes.collegesports.com/sports/m-baskbl/archive/osu-m-baskbl-sched-2004.html.  
 25
In addition, to discount the self-imposed scholarship reduction for the men’s 
basketball program on the basis that the 2005-06 recruiting class is projected to be one of 
the best in program history is extremely speculative.  The variables that affect a recruiting 
class, which include but are not limited to injury, ineligibility, NBA draft eligibility, 
transferring, are so numerous that it is illogical to minimize OSU’s self-imposed sanction.  
The corrective actions that OSU imposed once it became aware of O’Brien’s 
financial assistance to Radojevic and interrelated violations with Savovic were in 
accordance with their responsibility as a member to the NCAA responding to a major 
infraction.  However, the termination of O’Brien may potentially cost them millions of 
dollars and has also irreparably impaired the reputation of the athletics department.  
Further, OSU’s self-imposed sanctions were an effort to mitigate potential penalties 
imposed by the COI, but were actually minimized by the court and seemingly detrimental 
to their case against O’Brien. 
D. Future Impact of O’Brien Lawsuit 
This case may be a sign of increased litigation by college coaches who are fired as 
a result of NCAA rules violations.111  Specifically, coaches will challenge in court the 
admissibility of evidence against a coach gathered by the enforcement staff even though 
this evidence is accepted by the COI.  In the O’Brien case the court explicitly denied the 
admission of certain testimony given by Radojevic which was prepared by the 
enforcement staff. See the Ohio Court of Claims’ conclusions infra. Part III. B p. 15. 
However, this same testimony was used as rational for the COI findings against O’Brien 
                                                                                                                                                 
110 See Neuheisal settles for $4.5 million from UW, NCAA, (Mar. 8, 2005), at 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=2007123/ 
111 Id.   
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and former OSU assistant coach Paul Biancardi.  See the Committee on Infractions’ 
conclusions infra. Part. IV E p. 20.   
The COI imposed a five year show-cause order against O’Brien and a show-cause 
order against Biancardi which prohibits him from engaging in any recruiting activities 
from March 10, 2006 until October 1, 2007.112  At the time of the public report Biancardi 
was employed as head men’s basketball coach at Wright State University (Wright State).  
The COI required Wright State to appear before the COI to show-cause why it should not 
be penalized if it does not prohibit him from engaging in all recruiting activities for the 
specified time period.  Consequently, Biancardi resigned from Wright State three days 
following the COI public infractions report.113  A joint statement issued by Wright State 
and Biancardi read, “Paul Biancardi will no longer be employed as head coach of men’s 
basketball at Wright State University…As a result of the Ohio State University public 
infractions report by the NCAA, Wright State University believes it is in everyone’s best 
interest for the coach to move on to other opportunities.”114   
The court’s and NCAA’s differing evidentiary standard could implicate 
procedural and substantive due process challenges to show-cause orders and eventual 
termination of a coach’s employment at a member institution.  However, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that the NCAA is not a state actor in Tarkanian v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association.115  Further, the holding in Tarkanian was 
                                                 
112 OSU Report, supra note 9, at 43,  
113 Biancardi Resigns as Head Coach, (Mar. 13, 2006), at 
http://www.10tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=4625843&nav=LUESMuat. 
114 Id.  
115 Tarkanian v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
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recently reaffirmed in 2001 following the Supreme Courts decision in Brentwood 
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n.116 
The NCAA enforcement staff’s ability to obtain information about alleged 
violations may also be hindered as a result of this case and an increasing trend of 
litigation following termination due to violation of NCAA rules.  The NCAA only has the 
power to require individuals who are currently employed at a member institution to 
submit testimony.117  The NCAA does not have a subpoena power and therefore 
terminated coaches who know they will not return to intercollegiate coaching have a 
greater disincentive to provide information to the enforcement staff in order to protect 
legal interests against member institutions.   
 
VI. Proposed Solution- Arbitration in Coaching Contracts 
 
The NCAA is an autonomous, self-governing, private organization that retains the 
power to write rules and take actions that affect the member institutions and institutional 
actors.  The NCAA’s constitution, bylaws, and procedures govern the organization and 
create a contract between the organization, member institutions, and institutional actors.  
This contract provides the organization with the authority to establish rights, privileges 
and obligations of membership.  As such, it is important that the COI’s major infraction 
                                                 
116 Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).  
117 NCAA Bylaw  10.1 (“Unethical Conduct”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 53. 
…(a) refusal to furnish information relevant to an investigation of a possible violation of an 
NCAA regulation when requested to do so my the NCAA or the individuals institution 
  
NCAA Bylaw 19.01.3 (“Responsibility to Cooperate”), reprinted in NCAA Manuel, supra note 14, at 
343. 
All representatives of member institution shall cooperate fully with the NCAA enforcement staff, 
Committee on Infractions, Infractions Appeals Committee and Management Council to further the 
objectives of the Association and its enforcement program. 
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decisions are the sole interpretation of NCAA rules in order to maintain certainty within 
the membership.  In addition, the differing evidentiary standard in the courts and the COI 
hearings is detrimental to member institutions because the factual basis for the 
University’s employment termination decision may be valid in the COI hearing and not 
admissible in a court of law.  Utilizing mandatory binding arbitration in coaching 
contracts may limit these consequences and preserve the interpretation of NCAA rules to 
the Association (member institutions, conferences, and National Office).   
A. Arbitration in Athletics Disputes 
 Arbitration is utilized in professional sports and is found in the collective 
bargaining agreements of professional baseball, football, basketball, and ice hockey.118  
In addition, the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act119 endorsed the use of 
arbitration to resolve Olympic and amateur sports disputes.120  The issues in professional 
sports that are generally resolved using arbitration consist of injury grievances, non-
injury grievances, and salary arbitration.121  Further, the American Arbitration 
Association has administered proceedings pertaining to administrative issues facing 
sports organizations, specifically disputes over partnership proceeds, termination of 
sports executives, the sale of a franchise, and payments under executive or partnership 
agreements.122  The binding arbitration clause included in the coaching contract may be 
as broad or as narrow as the parties require- either resorting to arbitration for all disputes 
                                                 
118 Brent Morberg, Comment: Dispute Resolution in Intercollegiate Athletics, 4 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS 
L. 181, 187 (2003).  
119 Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220512 (2002).  
120 American Arbitration Association, Sports Arbitration, available at http://www.adr.org/SportsOlympic.  
121 American Arbitration Association, Sports Arbitration, available at http://www.adr.org/SportsOlympic. 
122 Id. 
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under the contract or only those concerning NCAA rules violations.123  An example 
clause that would encompass the entire contract reads: 
Any unresolved controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the 
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration 
Association in accordance with its Commercial (or other) Arbitration Rules, and 
judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof.124  
 
Arbitration would present several benefits to NCAA member institutions and the 
enforcement process when resolving employment disputes in the wake of a coach 
committing a major violation.  Specifically, arbitration procedural rules are typically 
more relaxed and informal with regards to evidence and discovery than the courts.125  
This would allow for evidence gathered by the institution and enforcement staff to be 
considered admissible both in the COI hearing and the employment dispute with the 
coach.  Additionally, the arbitrator is not bound by the substantive law and binding 
arbitration provides immunity to appellate challenge in the court system (unless fraud by 
the arbitrator or inconsistency with public policy).126   
Arbitration also enables the parties maintain a confidential proceeding.  Unlike 
the courts, the arbitrator does not produce a written decision and the outcome will be in 
the form of an award that may not be disclosed to the public.127   Confidentiality is 
beneficial to the enforcement process and ensures the COI findings and rationale are the 
sole interpretation of the facts and applicable NCAA rules.  Confidentiality is also 
beneficial for the member institution from a public relations standpoint.  “The failure to 
                                                 
123 Brent Morberg, Comment: Dispute Resolution in Intercollegiate Athletics, 4 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS 
L. 181, 196 (2003). 
124 Adam Epstein, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Sport Management and the Sport Management 
Curriculum, 12 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT, 153, 157 (2002).  
125 Brent Morberg, Navigating the Public Relations Minefield: Mutual Protection Through Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses in College Coaching Contracts, 16 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 85, 87 (2006). 
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maintain control over the dissemination of details of a dispute between a coach and 
institution can have serious consequences for both parties.”128   
Arbitration allows for the parties to choose their arbitrator(s) which will minimize 
the lack of control inherent in the judicial process.129  Arbitrators can be selected for both 
their legal expertise and their knowledge of the amateur sport system and sport-related 
issues.130  This enables the member institution to select an arbitrator who has experience 
and expertise with NCAA rules, campus compliance, and the NCAA enforcement 
process.  Arbitration may also limit the expenses associated with litigating (attorney’s 
fees and court costs) an employment dispute.131   
VII. Conclusion 
The underlying premise of  the paper is to address the inconsistencies between the 
decisions of the Ohio Court of Claims and the NCAA Committee on Infractions 
concerning the Ohio State University and Jim O’Brien dispute.  As I have stated, these 
inconsistencies are detrimental to both the Universities that comprise the NCAA and the 
NCAA enforcement process.  The benefits of binding arbitration for intercollegiate 
athletics are numerous and these benefits have been demonstrated both in professional 
sports and the Olympics.   
Professor Paul T. Haagen, Duke University School of Law, stated that the 
O’Brien court decision has put member institutions on notice and that “institutions should 
be incredibly careful about putting themselves in a position in which a judge, doing what 
                                                 
128 Id. at 101.  
129 Id. at 88.  
130 Hilary Findlay, Rules of a Sport-Specific Arbitration Process as an Instrument of Policy Making, 16 
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a judge is supposed to do, will hold them liable for things they believe with good reason 
— whether or not it’s sufficient reason — that they need to do.”132  Further, Professor 
Michael McCann, Mississippi College School of Law, stated that the court’s conclusion 
that a clear NCAA violation did not constitute a material breach of O’Brien’s 
employment contract…“By implication, the judge seems to be diminishing the 
importance of NCAA recruiting rules, and the idea that a rule violation should not 
constitute a material breach could — in theory — create deleterious incentives for 
coaches when recruiting players.”  The impact of the O’Brien case will have on future 
employment terminations in light of major violations is uncertain, but member 
institutions must rethink coaching contracts and termination decisions.     
Member institutions will continue to be proactive during a major investigation, 
which may lead to the termination of a coach prior to a Committee on Infractions finding, 
in order to mitigate NCAA sanctions.  As a result, arbitration may be a more controlled 
process than the courts and will provide flexible evidentiary standards and relaxed 
procedural rules that will specifically address the nature of the enforcement process and 
collegiate athletics.  
 
 
                                                 
132 Sports Law Blog, Jim O'Brien v. Ohio State University: Materiality, Honesty & Breach of Contract, 
available at http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/02/jim-obrien-v-ohio-state-university.html.  
